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Britain-Nepal relations through the prism of aid 
 
Jeevan Raj Sharma and Ian Harper 
 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we view Britain-Nepal relations through the prism of aid. 
Along with the recruitment of Gurkhas into the British Army, aid to Nepal 
has been one of the principal elements in the bilateral relationship 
between the two countries. For example, in 2015/2016, the budget for 
Nepal of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) 
stood at £101.5 million.1 Whilst the origins of aid can be traced back to 
financial support to colonial governments from the mid-late 19th century 
(Overseas Development Institute 1964), in this historical trawl through 
Britain-Nepal aid relations we focus on the period from 1952 to the 
present. We start with some methodological caveats – what we have 
focused on, what we have left out, and why we have approached this 
subject in the way we have - and then we divide the paper up to reflect 
aid in relation to Nepal’s most significant political eras and 
transformations. This represents our initial scoping of the terrain, and 
limited by length, and the breadth of the subject, the paper omits details 
of specifics, and deals with the subject matter with broad brush strokes. 
We conclude with observations on emerging analytical issues and the 
need for a political history of aid. 
 
What constitutes aid to Nepal? 
While deliberating how to approach this paper, we first had to consider 
what constitutes aid from Britain, as well as the diversity of these 
entanglements. Aid from Britain has supported projects such as road 
building, drinking water, community mobilisation for community 
forestry, delivery of health and education services in the middle hills, and 
has expanded in the last two decades to include other sectors such as 
strengthening civil society, governance, health systems, human rights, 
state-society relations, conflict, security, the peace process, political 
transition, climate change and natural disasters. 
                                                                                 
1 https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/NP, accessed 10 August 2017. 
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There are official channels: Britain’s Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to Nepal is mainly channelled through DFID2. This aid is channelled 
directly, through Britain’s bilateral projects or more indirectly, with its 
support of Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), and through Britain’s 
contributions to multilateral agencies, and global Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP) such as the Global Fund. Some of this aid is also 
delivered through the Ministry of Defence (MoD) - especially for Gurkha 
Welfare Support (GWS) Projects - and the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) to carry out political analysis. 
In addition to ODA, several Non-Governmental Organisations provide 
development and humanitarian assistance. These are faith-based 
missionary organisations such as United Mission to Nepal (UMN), with 
significant British input, and International Nepal Fellowship (INF); other 
UK based International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) such as 
Save the Children UK, Oxfam GB and ActionAid; and INGOs with a specific 
Nepal focus such as the Britain Nepal Medical Trust (BNMT). There are 
Universities involved in research collaborations- such as University 
College London, Liverpool, Oxford and Edinburgh, amongst others – that 
channel resources from the research funding bodies such as Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC), Medical Research Council (MRC), 
Nuffield Foundation and the Wellcome Trust. In addition to these, there 
are aid flows building on longstanding personal, professional and 
diasporic networks, and various forms of people-to-people aid from 
Britain to Nepal. 
These aid channels are influenced by changing patterns in aid flows 
informed by global trends such as neoliberal reforms, and the focus on 
security concerns post 9/11. Significant shifts also occur with changes in 
domestic politics and governments in Britain. Major critical events, such 
as the recent earthquakes in Nepal also have profound impacts on 
resource flows. In this paper, however, we attempt to read aid from 
Britain to Nepal primarily through the perspective of significant political 
changes in Nepal since the 1950s and link these to the context of shifting 
discourses on aid globally. Aid from Britain to Nepal reflects Nepal’s 
                                                                                 
2 DFID was established in 1997. Prior to that there have been several shifts in institutions 
responsible for management of British aid, reflecting political changes in the UK. 
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political specificity in addition to being shaped by shifting global 
parameters on aid.  Accordingly, this paper is organized around the time-
line of Nepal’s political history: pre-1951, 1952-1960, 1960-1990, 1990-
1996, 1996-2006 and 2006 onwards. We also focus primarily on official 
development assistance. 
 
Sources and methodological caveats  
Researching aid from Britain to Nepal is methodologically challenging. 
While there is plenty of writing on foreign aid in Nepal, there is very little 
specific detail on aid from Britain to Nepal.3 There are passing references 
made on aid from Britain to Nepal in a number of published texts, but 
with little specific detail (Bell 2014, Fujikura 2013, Harper 2014, Justice 
1989, Khadka 1991, Mihaly 2002, Pandey 1999, Shrestha 1998, Whelpton 
2005). We also note that in this survey paper, we have not developed a 
critical theoretical position, be that post-structuralist, neo-Marxist or 
another. 
While it is relatively easy to find information on Britain’s ODA flows 
and brief information on institutional shifts, unlike USAID there has been 
no systematic documenting of the work of ODA over the last six decades, 
and there is almost no documentation on British aid to Nepal. In addition 
to archiving its reports and making them accessible to the public through 
its dedicated website (https://dec.usaid.gov/dec), USAID has published 
documentation of its work in the form of a book (Isaacson et al. 2001). 
Outside of ODA, some organisations such as Britain Nepal Medical Trust 
(BNMT) and United Mission to Nepal (UMN) that are conscious of their 
institutional history have documented their work in Nepal. British INGOs 
active in Nepal such as Save the Children UK, Oxfam GB and ActionAid 
amongst others have not documented their history. Aside from mainly 
missionary memoirs – of which there are a number - we are unaware of 
accounts of experiences of British aid workers and expatriates working 
in Nepal.4 The aid efforts based on long-standing personal, professional 
and diasporic networks are dispersed and can only be documented 
through oral and life histories of individuals. 
                                                                                 
3The working paper written by Nickson (1992) is a very useful source of information on 
British aid to Nepal. We draw on this document extensively in this paper. 
4 See for example Cundy (1997) and Dickinson (2016). 
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In writing this paper we have relied largely on British sources and 
those that are written in English. This is primarily because we have not 
come across any written documents in Nepali (except for annual reports 
from the Ministry of Finance and Social Welfare Council in Nepal, which 
record information on the volume of aid from different bilateral and 
multilateral donors - including British ODA - and offer limited 
information on the listing of activities of INGOs and missionaries). Some 
information on British official assistance is available in the UK National 
Archives, with limited data on specific projects available from a website 
managed by DFID, called devtracker (http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/ 
countries/NP/). According to this portal, so far there have been 74 
projects set up since DFID was established in 1997, with 27 projects active 
as of 1 March 2015. There are also a few public documents including 
DFID’s evaluation of its Nepal Country Programme (2001-06), Country 
Assistance Plan (2004), DFID Nepal Operational Plan published in 2014 and 
a Parliamentary Committee report on DFID’s bilateral aid programme 
(2015) amongst others. Thus, it is the voice of the provider of ODA, which 
is easily accessible to any researcher. 
We try to address this lacuna in the lack of documentation on British 
aid to Nepal by drawing on the mapping of activities of different British 
development organisations active in Nepal in addition to reviewing 
various documents and grey literature on aid from Britain to Nepal. This 
paper is also informed by our ESRC-DFID research on the mapping of 
external development assistance into Maternal Child Health 
programmes.5 
 
Pre-1951 
The origins of British aid can be traced back to the financial support 
provided to British colonies, beginning with grants-in-aid to colonial 
governments in the 1870s. Support was more formally instituted by the 
Colonial Development Act 1929, which made loans and grants available 
for projects such as infrastructural investment (White 1998). The 
subsequent 1940 Colonial Welfare and Development Act (and its successor 
in 1945) made more funds available and expanded the support to include 
                                                                                 
5 For details, please see http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk/projects?ref=ES%2FL005565%2F1, 
accessed 10 August 2017. 
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education and social services as necessary to support economic 
development (ODI 1964). British aid did not make it into Nepal under 
these laws. 
When the Ranas were overthrown through a nationalist movement 
with India’s support in 1950, the country opened up to foreign aid, 
modernisation and development. Since then, Nepal’s development 
trajectory has been shaped by successive aid regimes. Foreign aid made 
its official debut into Nepal with the signing of the Four Point agreement 
with the United States on 23 January 1951, followed by aid from India and 
China (Mihaly 2002). 
 
Early beginning: 1954- 1960 
Aid began to pour into Nepal as the US, India and China competed for geo-
political influence in Nepal. While the primary motivation for the US 
assistance was aimed at strengthening countries and governments 
vulnerable to the threat of communism, India and China focused aid in 
strategic sectors such as road building and airport construction. The first 
two major projects undertaken by India were an airport in Kathmandu 
and a road linking Kathmandu and the Indian border town of Raxaul 
(Adhikari 2014).  
British aid did not feature in these geo-political strategies. During this 
period, Britain maintained very close relationships with the monarchy, 
as it was fearful that the democratic government could put restrictions 
on the recruitment of Gurkhas (Nickson 1992). Its limited support 
included fellowships for Nepalis under the Colombo Plan,6 and providing 
motorcycles for the Nepalese army in 1958. Britain helped set up a 70-bed 
British Military Hospital at the Gurkha recruitment centre in Dharan in 
1957, primarily to service the medical needs of Gurkha soldiers serving in 
the British army and their families. An important form of aid from Britain 
to Nepal by missionaries started in 1954, with the Church of Scotland 
                                                                                 
6 As stated on its website, ‘The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic 
and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific was conceived at the 
Commonwealth Conference on Foreign Affairs held in Colombo, Ceylon 
(now Sri Lanka) in January 1950 and was launched on 1 July 1951 as a 
cooperative venture for the economic and social advancement of the 
peoples of South and Southeast Asia.’ Source: http://www.colombo-
plan.org/index.php/about-cps/history/, accessed 10 August 2017.  
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being one of the founders of the inter-denominational UMN in 1954 (UMN 
1999). 
 
Consolidation of Panchayat system: 1960–1990 
Britain became active in providing aid to Nepal following King 
Mahendra’s takeover in 1960 and the introduction of the Panchayat 
system in 1962. Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) began to work in 
Nepal in 1964. Throughout the next three decades, British aid helped to 
consolidate the Panchayat system in Nepal. It provided machinery, 
presses and other printing equipment to the Ministry of Information and 
to the state-controlled newspaper Gorkhapatra, which were key 
instruments through which the Panchayat regime promoted its version 
of nationalism (Nickson 1992). Britain also gave aid to Radio Nepal in the 
form of studio equipment, with a 100 KW medium wave and a 100 KW 
short wave transmitter. It also helped set up Buddhanilkantha School, an 
elite school in the outskirts of Kathmandu, as a part of its nation-building 
project. Despite the deteriorating economic situation and aspirations for 
democracy in the 1980s, the British government provided staunch 
support to the Panchayat system. During this decade, Nepal received 
three separate visits from British ministers responsible for aid and a visit 
by the Queen in February 1986. In her speech the Queen said, ‘It gives me 
great pleasure to be able to congratulate Your Majesty on the recent 25th 
anniversary of your Panchayat system of government’ (ibid: 6). 
For a land-locked country with limited road networks, British 
assistance focused on connectivity through road building. In the east, 
Britain funded road projects linking the Indian border town of Jogbini to 
Dharan, which was later extended to Dhankuta, Hille and Basantapur in 
the hills. It supported a part of King Mahendra’s East-West highway 
project between Narayangadh and Butwal, and also supported the 
upgrading of the Mugling-Malekhu section of the road connecting 
Kathmandu to Pokhara and Narayangath. 
Road building and its impact were thus of major interest to Britain. In 
the 1970s, ODA also financed major research into this topic. The Overseas 
Development Group at the University of East Anglia was contracted to 
investigate the impact of the Siddhartha highway, which connected the 
Nepal-India border town of Sunauli to Pokhara and of its feeder roads. 
The resulting report, later published as the book Nepal in Crisis, concluded 
 Sharma and Harper 151 
that the road network did little to promote economic development or 
reduce inequalities (Blaikie et al. 1980). On the contrary, the authors 
argued that road construction had deepened market forces, which made 
people more vulnerable to poverty. A re-examination of the same region 
after 20 years, however, gave a slightly more optimistic picture, because 
labour out-migration had not resulted in impoverishment as migrant 
remittance had contributed to the maintenance of living standards 
(Blaikie et al. 2002). 
Aid was given for the establishment of agricultural extension work in 
the Lumle area near Pokhara in 1968 and at Pakhrebas in the Dhankuta 
area in 1972. British aid also supported the Koshi Hills Area Development 
Programme, a major integrated rural development programme in four 
districts in the eastern hills (Sankhuwasabha, Dhankuta, Terhathum and 
Bhojpur) and also a drinking water programme in Eastern Nepal (the 
Eastern Region Water Supply Project).7 The nature of British official aid 
in this period, including its geographical concentration, was shaped by 
British interest in the recruitment of Gurkhas. British support focused on 
the middle hills of Nepal, in areas where former Gurkhas came from or 
went back to settle after completing their service. The British 
Government made an attempt to train the former Gurkha soldiers of the 
British Army as health and veterinary workers in Nepal, which was not 
successful (Stevenson 1976).8 Thus, the focus of British aid was 
particularly concentrated in and around the Pokhara and 
Dharan/Dhankuta areas. In this sense, the aid programmes could be seen 
as a form of compensation or reparation for the loss of their labour from 
the hills. Thus, part of British aid can be considered as a form of social 
protection offered to former Gurkhas and their families. 
A number of British NGOs began to work in Nepal during this period. 
BNMT started in 1967; Save the Children UK in 1976; ActionAid in 1982. 
Oxfam and Care also opened their Nepal offices. These INGOs delivered 
services in the fields of health, education, literacy, social development 
                                                                                 
7 Both these projects have been severely criticized for their limited impact. It was alleged 
that the contractors for the latter absorbed funds without significant results being shown 
for this - the allegation, for example, that taps installed by the program were only a few 
meters away from those installed by UNICEF (Nickson 1992). 
8 Many of the service users (who were also neighbours or relatives) did not pay these health 
workers or veterinary workers for their services, and the government did not put forward 
a programme to integrate them into the health system. 
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etc. but their geographical focus and visibility was limited. During the 
Panchayat period, the government did not allow programmes that had 
explicit political messages or that supported political activities. It was 
really only after the 1990 political and constitutional changes that these 
INGOs became more visible and expanded their programmes, boosted by 
increased funding from the UK government. 
 
Democratisation and expansion of civil society: 1990–1996 
The political changes of 1990 had a significant effect on British aid to 
Nepal. The fall of the Panchayat system was met with rising aspirations 
for development and the growth of NGOs, civil society and the public 
sphere in general. A number of British INGOs began to expand their work 
in Nepal in collaboration or partnership with the growing number of 
Nepali NGOs and expanding civil society organisations. British aid 
increasingly focused on human rights work and several civil society 
organisations as a part of Nepal’s democratisation and the expansion of 
the public sphere. 
Official British Development Assistance continued to support 
integrated rural development projects under the banner of the Koshi 
Hills Development Project in eastern Nepal until 1993. In 1993, a major 
Nepal-UK forestry project began which included the four districts of 
Koshi and additional districts in the Dhaulagiri region. This project was a 
part of Nepal’s community forestry programme, which involved handing 
over the management of forests to community groups. 
In the health sector, the Dharan hospital was handed over to the 
government and became the Eastern Regional Hospital. In 1994 ODA sent 
a mission to the country to identify challenges in the health sector, and 
this led to the start of the Nepal Safe Motherhood Program (NSMP) aimed 
at tackling maternal mortality through a number of activities in 1997. 
ODA’s support to research programmes continued with funding to the 
UCL-MIRA collaboration on women’s groups and maternal health in 
Makwanpur district. 
 
Conflict and security: 1996–2006 
The 1998 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) presaged the opening of a local 
office in 1999, and planned a programme of £16 million per year 
increasing to £21 million by 2001-02 (Chapman 2007). DFID constructed 
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and opened its new office in Kathmandu in April 1999.The CSP stressed 
the need to address poverty and to introduce new aid modalities such as 
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAp).9 The CSP was in line with the Nepal 
government’s Ninth Development Plan. While the CSP gave increased 
attention to governance and to meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs),10 it also shared the failure of the government’s plan to 
address the emerging Maoist and ethnic conflict or its underlying causes. 
Britain continued to support a number of social development 
initiatives in Nepal in health, water, forestry, and road construction in 
addition to its support for governance, and human rights. It provided 
important support for safe motherhood, the decentralisation of health 
services and governance reform through its Enabling State Programme 
(ESP).11 It went on to play a lead role in health Sector Wide Approaches 
(SWAps) in 2004, and has since been providing technical assistance for 
the implementation of the Nepal Health Sector Programme (NHSP). 
However, the Maoist insurgency and its agenda of social and political 
transformation and the fact that it emerged from age-old structural 
inequalities came as a major surprise to the aid community, including 
DFID (Donini and Sharma 2014). Despite providing aid to Nepal for over 
four decades, British official aid had not framed its assistance around 
inequality in Nepali society and politics (see Department for 
International Development 1998). 
 
Although British aid was never a direct target of the Maoists, there 
was a heightened focus on security issues amongst the British aid officials 
and their projects. DFID took a lead in the introduction of Basic Operating 
Guidelines (BOGs) to protect aid projects and personnel from overt 
manipulation and to ensure space for development and humanitarian 
work in the midst of conflict (Donini and Sharma 2014). An example of 
accommodation in Maoist-controlled areas is provided by the DFID-
supported Livelihoods and Forestry Programme (LFP) that developed 
                                                                                 
9 A SWAp is a process in which funding from different financing sources for a particular 
sector supports a single policy and expenditure programme, under government leadership, 
and adopting common approaches across the sector. 
10 MDGs were eight global development goals with clear measurable targets with the target 
achievement date of 2015. For details see: 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/index.htm, accessed 10 August 2017. 
11https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-108572/, accessed 20 February 2017. 
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ways to continue working effectively through Forestry User Groups 
(FUGs) in rural communities affected by the conflict. During the conflict, 
community FUGs experienced many difficulties, yet despite these, they 
withstood much of the pressure and continued to operate effectively. A 
study conducted by Andrea Nightingale and Jeevan Raj Sharma found 
that a ‘conflict-sensitive approach’12 contributed to the ability of the 
programme to continue to work during the conflict period. Because the 
programme was grounded in the communities, neither the state nor the 
Maoists were able to manipulate it to their advantage (Nightingale and 
Sharma 2014). 
9/11 was a critical event in changing the perspective of the British aid 
programme. The British government at first saw the Maoist insurgency 
through the lens of security, and this view converged with the 
Government of Nepal’s attempts to fight the Maoists. Like other bilateral 
donors, DFID was initially reluctant to define the situation in Nepal as a 
conflict-related humanitarian emergency, as this would have 
contradicted the government’s portrayal of it as law and order problem 
(Donini and Sharma 2014). DFID also feared this would imply an implicit 
recognition of the Maoists as a legitimate interlocutor with whom issues 
of access for humanitarian actors would need to be discussed. It is for this 
reason that DFID introduced the concept of development-oriented 
emergency aid, linking relief to medium-term and long-term 
development efforts (Donini and Sharma 2014). In other words, in a 
conflict environment development programmes were deemed to be 
relevant, if not more appropriate than large-scale humanitarian 
programmes. This view is expressed in a DFID-commissioned multi-year 
Country Programme evaluation:  
 
In Nepal, DFID demonstrated that development programmes could 
address the consequences of conflict on poor communities as 
opposed to large-scale humanitarian action. This was achieved by the 
adoption by development programmes (outside of Government 
structures) of a semi-humanitarian approach, i.e. targeted, quick 
delivery, and tangible outputs (Chapman et al. 2007: 69–70).  
                                                                                 
12 To minimize the effect of armed conflict in development, many development partners 
and INGOs, including DFID, adopted conflict sensitive approaches such as Safe and Effective 
Development in Conflict (SEDC) and Do No Harm policies.  
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While attempting to resolve inequalities and grievances had not really 
been the focus of British aid to Nepal, the need to reconsider aid in the 
context of Nepal’s emerging conflict played a role in shifting priorities. 
While initially DFID accepted the government narrative that the Maoist 
insurgency was primarily a security problem to be addressed with force, 
in 2002, the agency was able to challenge the government’s narrative and 
raised concerns over human rights abuses, as it began to see Nepal as a 
‘fragile state’ (Chapman et al. 2007). DFID undertook conflict analysis and 
began to share analysis on the causes of conflict (Goodhand 2000). It 
opened a Risk Management Office (together with Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [GIZ]) in 2002 (Chapman et al. 2007). 
Britain also provided support to the UN Human Rights Office to 
monitor and protect human rights in Nepal. It supported a human rights 
advisor position that played a key role in the overall monitoring of the 
situation, and also supported human rights NGOs in monitoring and 
documenting human rights abuses, which were central to putting 
pressure on the government over its excessive use of force. Overall, 
therefore, DFID made an important contribution towards keeping Nepal’s 
conflict on the international agenda. This included organising three 
London conferences in this regard (in 2002, 2005 and 2007) (Chapman et 
al. 2007). 
There was a gradual recognition that the grievances caused by 
widespread inequalities had contributed to increase support for the 
Maoist insurgency (Chapman et al. 2007). In this context, the 2004 Country 
Assistance Plan (CAP) reoriented DFID to respond to the causes of conflict. 
The new direction, which took two years to prepare, introduced peace-
building and social inclusion as strategic pillars. DFID and the World Bank 
undertook a major research exercise entitled the ‘Nepal Gender and 
Social Exclusion Assessment’, which resulted in an influential publication 
Unequal Citizens (Department for International Development and World 
Bank 2005), which contributed to pushing the issue of exclusion up the 
donor agenda. Against this background, the European donors (such as 
DFID, Danida and the Norwegian Embassy) had begun to channel 
significant funding to work on the issue of gender, caste and ethnicity 
through the lens of inclusion and empowerment of these groups. Britain 
provided aid to the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) 
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for the Janajati Empowerment Project, which attracted some criticism 
from within Nepal for its specific focus on ethnicity- driven politics 
(Sharma 2012).13 
The political situation changed dramatically in 2005-2006 with the 
royal take-over followed by the people’s movement, which resulted in the 
overthrow of the monarchy and signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement of 21 November 2006. Finally, in 2006, with the reinstatement 
of parliament, aid from Britain had focused on post-conflict political 
transition, elections for Constitutional Assembly and wider issues of 
political settlement. 
 
Post-conflict transition: 2006–present 
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a critical 
event in Nepal’s political history as it paved the road for a political 
settlement based on the principles of equality, inclusion and the 
restructuring of Nepal into a secular, republican and a federal state.  
Throughout the transition phase, Britain continued to support human 
rights documentation and protection work in addition to supporting the 
implementation of the peace process, the two elections for the 
Constitutional Assembly and security sector reform. Focussing on the 
peace process and the aim of an inclusive political settlement, funding 
followed for a series of conflict assessments and for UN offices, 
organisations of politically marginal groups such as dalits, janajatis and 
madhesis and INGOs such as the International Crisis Group, Carter Centre, 
Saferworld and Search for Common Ground. In the wake of growing 
public criticisms against DFID’s funding for the Janajati Empowerment 
Programme (JEP) and NEFIN’s decision to call for banda (a general strike), 
DFID ended its support to JEP saying that it did not support political 
activities (Sharma 2015). This was an awkward response for DFID as its 
support had, of course, in many senses always been political. 
DFID’s support to the health sector, mainly focused around the Sector 
Wide Approach, continued through its technical assistance office in the 
Ministry of Health with outsourcing to private contractors such as the 
London-based Options Private Limited (Options) and North Carolina-
                                                                                 
13 Also see http://www.newbusinessage.com/MagazineArticles/view/166, accessed 8 
March 2016. 
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based Research Triangle International (RTI). This eventually led to the 
introduction of the Aama Programme (officially known as Aama 
Surakchya Karyakram) in Nepal in 2009. The DFID-funded safe 
motherhood project that initially started in 1997 had successfully used 
the tactic of lobbying to achieve the legalisation of abortion and also to 
introduce financial incentives for institutional delivery in Nepal as a way 
to reach MDG targets (Ensor et al. 2008). 
DFID also continued with its major bilateral service delivery 
programme called the Community Support Programme (CSP), a local 
governance programme called the Local Governance and Community 
Development Programme (LGCDP) and the Rural Access Programme 
(RAP) amongst others. Its support for LGCDP was controversial because 
there was no local government to begin with, and the consequent lack of 
accountability allegedly escalated corruption (ICAI 2014). DFID also 
supported various programmes for strengthening security and justice, 
and more recently for building resilience and adaption to climate change 
and disaster risk reduction. It supported the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) to carry out political analysis, and worked with Adam Smith 
International (ASI) to foster inclusive economic growth. Its work on 
economic growth has also focused on technical support to facilitate 
power development agreements to build on Nepal’s hydro resources and 
attract foreign direct investment, although there is very little 
information available on the fate of such support. 
We finish with the Nepal Earthquake of April 2015. While DFID has 
been providing assistance in building resilience and disaster risk 
reduction, these have been limited to small-scale initiatives.14 In the 
aftermath of the Earthquake, Britain initially pledged to provide £5 
million aid in humanitarian assistance to Nepal, which was later 
increased to more than £70 million. Through the British Disasters 
Emergency Commission (DEC) the UK public donated a further £85 
million. Much of this aid was distributed via British INGOs. Nepal rejected 
the British offer of Chinook helicopters for humanitarian assistance in 
the immediate aftermath. According to newspaper reports, the British 
helicopters reached as far as Delhi airport in India, but Nepali authorities 
                                                                                 
14 http://www.spotlightnepal.com/News/Article/Our-development-assistance-is-being-
utilised-well-, accessed 4 March 2016. 
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turned down the British offer, reportedly because of the anger among the 
Nepal Army over Colonel Lama’s arrest and trial under universal 
jurisdiction in the UK.15  Despite the initial outpouring of assistance, the 
full implications of the evolving bilateral relations in the aftermath are 
still unknown. 
 
Conclusion 
We conclude this paper with the following broad observations: 
 
With the decline in the recruitment of Gurkhas in the British Army, 
aid from Nepal has come to occupy one of the principal elements in the 
bilateral relationship between the two countries. ODA is one of the few 
areas of British public expenditure not to have been cut in recent times, 
and official development assistance from Britain to Nepal has increased 
over the years. 
British aid to Nepal reflects political changes in Nepal. While British 
aid helped consolidate the Nepali political regime during the Panchayat 
system, it has more recently supported a variety of more politically 
contentious sectors such as human rights, governance and civil society in 
the early 1990s, conflict and security since the Maoist insurgency, and 
issues around state restructuring, post-conflict, peace and humanitarian 
assistance since 2006. Despite significant impact, this aid is not insulated 
from patronage networks and has been subject to allegations of 
corruption (Bell 2014). More recently, aid from Britain has been 
challenged and subjected to more nationalistic and sovereignty-based 
critique within Nepal. Such discourse led to Nepal’s rejection of British 
helicopters for humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of Nepal’s 
Earthquake, for example. 
While the UK government does provide budget support to the Sector 
Wide Approach in the health and education sectors, a major part of its 
development and humanitarian assistance is delivered through UK-based 
INGOs, Universities and research consortia. Increasingly, this involves 
                                                                                 
15 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/nepal-earthquake-british-
chinooks-banned-from-delivering-aid-in-case-they-blow-roofs-off-10246876.html and 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3101650/1m-wasted-Nepal-Chinooks-
Helicopters-set-return-Britain-diplomatic-wrangling-meant-sat-doing-month.html, 
accessed 30 June 2017. 
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private contractors whose roles range from procurement and providing 
technical advice, to managing and delivering programmes themselves. 
This practice results in a large part of aid being consumed by 
intermediaries as transactional costs to pay for British expatriates and 
staff based in the UK, and it leaves very little space for local organisations 
to build their own capacity. 
Finally, there is a need for further empirical documentation of British 
aid to Nepal that takes into account the experiences and insights of those 
involved in the process. In addition, it would be valuable to further map 
all the other forms of aid from Britain. Most importantly, there is a 
definite need for a political history that would take into account the views 
and perspectives of both the recipients and intermediaries, and that 
would further supplement our understanding of Britain Nepal relations. 
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